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WASHINGTON'S WAR WITH NICARAGUA 
Since the 1979 overthrow of the regime of Anastasio Somoza Debayle by the Sandinista 
National Liberation Front (FSLN), Nicaraguans 
have been confronted by a fierce U.S.-led destabilization campaign. According to the R
eagan administration, such a campaign is justified 
by the fact that the Sandinista government is a Soviet-Cuban puppet which poses a d
ire threat to the stability of the Hemisphere and 
the security of the U.S. 
To date, there has been no direct U.S. military intervention of N icaragua, but an unac
knowledged and undeclared war is clearly being 
waged against that country. What the U.S. has done is to organize, finance, supply, a
nd direct a proxy-war fought by former members 
of the National Guard, the hated police and military force used by the Somoza dynas
ty to repress the Nicaraguan population for more 
than forty years. These "contras " claim that they serve merely as a rallying point for dis
affected Nicaraguans who would like to join 
them in opposing the Sandinistas. The U.S. claims that it is backing these "freedom
 fighters" only as a means of ending Sandinista 
support for and supply of arms to rebels in El Salvador. But even knowledgeable U.S. o
fficials must admit that the Salvadorean guerrillas 
have had easy access to arms from a range of sources and that at no time since 1981-a
nd probably not before-have they been critically 
dependent on supplies that might have reached them from Nicaragua. 
In the face of the growing tension that Washington's war with Nicaragua brings to L
atin America, other governments in the region 
have attempted to find a negotiated settlement before war explodes among neighborin
g countries. The governments of Colombia, Mex-
ico, Panama, and Venezuela have formed a regional negotiating body called the CON
T ADORA Group, but the U.S. response to their 
initiatives have been lukewarm. Instead, the Reagan administration has created a Nat
ional Bipartisan Commission on Central America 
to study the situation. This ISSUE BRIEF presents the views of Dr. Antonio Jarquin
, Nicaragua's Ambassador to the U.S.; describes 
the current situation in Nicaragua; analyzes Reagan administration policy; and exam
ines alternatives to current U.S. policies. □ 
Ambassador Antonio Jarquin 
NICARAGUA IS PREPARED 
TO ESTABLISH NORMAL . .. 
RELATIONS WITH THE 
U.S. WE DEMAND ONLY 
THAT OUR COUNTRY ... 
BE RESPECTED. WE HAVE 
A RIGHT TO SELF-DETER-
MINATION. WE HAVE A 
RIGHT TO A LIFE OF 
DIGNITY, AND WE WILL DEFEND THAT RIGHT. 
How would you describe current relations between the 
United States and Nicaragua? 
Jarquin: The relations between the two countries are tense 
because of the hostile attitude of the Reagan administration 
towards the people and government of Nicaragua. Even be-
fore taking office, the Reagan administration announced 
that they would do everything possible to overthrow the gov-
ernment of Nicaragua. And just a few months after Presi-
dent Reagan was inaugurated, we began to hear reports 
about millions of dollars being allocated to finance CIA 
covert operations against the Nicaraguan government. The 
Reagan administration has promoted the regrouping of the 
defeated former Somoza National Guard; allowed them to 
train openly in Florida, Texas, and California (in clear viola-
tion of the United States Neutrality Act); and later trans-
ferred them to Honduras. From bases in Honduras, these 
former guards are now attacking and killing Nicaraguan 
citizens along the border areas-with weapons and direction 
provided by the CIA. 
Our government as well as those of several Western Euro-
pean and Latin American countries have tried, to no avail, 
to persuade the Reagan administration to set aside its mili-
taristic approach to the problems of Central America. 
What role is Nicaragua playing in the current situation in 
El Salvador and Central America? 
Jarquin: The government of Nicaragua morally supports the 
struggle of the people of El Salvador. We cannot do other-
wise because we are a people that have suffered oppression 
and injustice and we are a people who since July 19, 1979 
began to enjoy freedom for the first time in our history. We 
believe that it is the moral obligation of those who enjoy 
freedom to support the struggle of people elsewhere who 
are fighting to be free. 
Our support, however, does not include material aid . It 
is interesting to note that the Reagan administration has not 
presented any evidence to support its allegation that there 
is a flow of arms from Nicaragua to the revolutionary forces 
in El Salvador. I submit that no such evidence is forthcoming 
because such flows of arms do not exist. It is not the policy 
of the government of Nicaragua to give material aid to the 
guerrillas in El Salvador because we know that this is precise-
ly the pretext that the Reagan administration would like to 
have as a justification to intervene in El Salvador. 
What are the problems that Nicaragua sees as impediments 
to the normalization of relations between your country and 
the United States? 
Jarquin: The fundamental impediment is the attitude of the 
Reagan administration as reflected in its policy towards 
Nicaragua. Nicaragua is prepared to establish normal and 
friendly relations with the United States. We demand only 
that our country, though small in territorial extension, be 
respected. We have a right to self-determination. We have 
a right to a life of dignity, and we will defend that right. 
We cannot accept the proposition that a life of dignity for 
the Nicaraguan people precludes the possibility of normal, 
respectful, and peaceful relations between our country and 
the government of the United States of America. 
What steps is your government prepared to take to bring 
about regional peace and to improve relations with the 
United States? 
Jarquin: On the 19th of July of this year, the government 
of Nicaragua presented a six-point peace proposal. At that 
time, my government stated its willingness to address the 
concerns that the government of the United States claims 
to have with respect to Nicaragua. We also stated that the 
co,ncerns of Nicaragua with respect to the United States 
should be addressed as well. The Reagan administration's 
response was the deployment of three major naval task 
forces and the announced stationing of U.S. troops in Hon-
duras, precisely in the region of that country which is used 
by the former Somoza national guards as sanctuaries and 
staging areas for attacks against Nicaragua. 
Nevertheless, we will continue to pursue a peaceful solu-
tion to the conflict and be supportive of the initiatives of 
the CONT ADORA group because the alternative that is be-
ing pursued by the Reagan administration will inevitably lead 
to a Vietnam-like situation in the heart of this continent. 
We are convinced that the people of the United States do 
not wish to see a repetition of the nightmare of Vietnam-
an experience we in Central American most definitely would 
like to avoid. 
The Reagan administration describes the counterrevolu-
tionary forces as "freedom fighters" and denies that it is 
aiding in an attempt to overthrow your government. Jlow 
would you describe these forces? 
Jarquin: The Reagan administration's "freedom fighters" 
are, in fact,' remnants of the former Somoza National 
Guard-organized, trained, armed, and directed by the U.S. 
government through the CIA. These "freedom fighters" are 
the same people that murdered more than fifty thousand 
Nicaraguans during the last two years of the Somoza family 
dictatorship. The Reagan administration's "freedom 
fighters" are· former members of what was, in effect, 
Somoza's private army-an army which kept Somoza in 
power for more than forty-five years through torture, repres-
sion, and murder of more than three hundred thousand 
citizens of Nicaragua. 
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With respect to U.S. aid to these former Somoza National 
Guards, there is no question whatsoever. The U.S. House 
of Representatives voted this past summer to cut off funds 
going to Somoza guards-via the CIA-precisely because 
the majority of the members of that body have become con-
vinced that these funds are being used, in violation of the 
laws of the United States, to sponsor the overthrow of a 
government that has diplomatic relations with the United 
States. Also there are statements by the leaders of these 
counterrevolutionary forces affirming that they are receiv-
ing aid from the U.S. government. 
Recently, three former pilots of Somoza's Air Force were 
shot down in a DC-3C while flying a supply mission over 
Nicaraguan territory. These former Somoza guards, one of 
them an ex-major, stated categorically that the CIA gave 
the airplane to the counterrevolutionary forces . They added 
that the CIA plans to ship more planes and to retrain more 
pilots before November, when a major offensive against 
Nicaraguan population centers is scheduled to begin. 
How would you assess the recent U.S. invasion of Grenada? 
What are the implications for U.S.-Nicaraguan relations? 
Jarquin: The U.S. invasion of Grenada is in fact the 
culmination of a plan set in motion by the Reagan adminis-
tration upon assuming office, and it consists fundamental-
ly of doing everything possible, including the use of military 
force, to impose the will of the U.S. government on coun-
tries like Grenada and Nicaragua. 
Why has the U.S. government unleashed an international 
campaign of slogans, lies, half truths, and distortions against 
Nicaragua? I submit that this is all part of a plan that seeks 
to create a climate that the Reagan administration would 
then use to provoke actions in Central America which would 
subsequently and irrevocably lead to direct U.S. military in-
tervention, an eventuality bound to spark a regional war in 
Central America. 
The tragedy in Grenada should give us pause. We should 
ask ourselves whether in the fourth quarter of the twentieth 
century we are going to allow the discredited and failed 
policy of the past hundred and more years of successive U.S. 
governments towards Latin America and the Caribbean to 
continue and hence, foster the seeds of resentment and con-
flicts, or if we are to fashion a new relationship based on 
respect and the recognition that peace is guaranteed only 
when justice and freedom prevails for all. 
Today the people of Nicaragua are enraged because of 
the crimes against us committed by the U.S. government. 
The fury of the people when just is also sacred and more 
powerful than naval fleets, tanks, or war planes. We are not 
a military power but we feel ourselves to be a moral power. 
That is why the war against Nicaragua would not be con-
ventional. If attacked, we will defend ourselves. We are sure 
that we will be supporte,d by other people of this continent, 
including important sectors of the U.S. 
The people of Nicaragua, even as·' we prepare ourselves 
to repel any outside aggression, cqntinue to be optimistic 
that reason will triumph and that the forces of war present-
ly unleashed will be reined in, never again to be set free. 
It is still not too late. D 
THE KISSINGER COMMISSION 
World attention was at least temporarily diverted from 
U.S. militarization of Central America by President Rea-
gan's appointment of Henry Kissinger as chairman of the 
National Bipartisan Commission on Central America. The 
Commission seems to be an essential element of administra-
tion efforts to dispel the growing opposition of U.S. policy 
in Central America. Reagan administration officials repeat-
edly have told reporters that criticism of U.S. policy should 
be withheld until the Commission report is submitted on 
January 10, 1984. 
The names of appointees to the Commission were an-
nounced with great fanfare, but of the twelve named 
(Nicholas Brady, Henry Cisneros, William Clements, Carlos 
Diaz-Alejandro, Wilson Johnson, Lane Kirkland, Richard 
Scammon, John Silber, Potter Stewart, Robert Strauss, and 
William Walsh) none has generated the controversy which 
accompanied the announcement of its chairman. Even Kiss-
inger supporters admitted that the former Secretary of State 
had neither exhibited an interest or demonstrated expertise 
in Central American affairs. Many others noted his tendency 
to view every conflict as a product of Soviet influence. Kiss-
inger's role in the CIA orchestrated overthrow of Chile's 
Salvador Allende and in U.S.-South African attempts to un-
seat the Angolan government exacerbated concerns about 
his leadership of the Commission. 
The Commission's investigative process has been as con-
ttoversial as its membership. The Commission sent ques-
tionnaires to more than 200 people selected by its staff and 
approved by the 12 Commissioners. Some recipients com-
mented publicly that the questions were too broad, sought 
basic information, and were suggestive of particular 
answers. Others noted that educational groups and area 
specialists with progressive postures were not even asked to 
share their views. 
The travel itinerary for the Commission's fact finding mis-
sion also suggested that only information favorable to the 
administration was being sought. Only nine hours were 
scheduled for a visit to Nicaragua. Instead, at least three 
members of the Commission, including Kissinger himself, 
took time while in Costa Rica to meet with U.S.-sponsored 
forces fighting the Nicaraguan government. This meeting 
not only contradicted the publicly-stated Commission policy 
of traveling together, but caused dissension among Com-
mission members who felt that it was an inappropriate 
breach of protocol to meet with anti-government forces 
before meeting with the Nicaraguan government itself. San 
Antonio Mayor Henry Cisneros spoke to reporters about 
the apparent double-standard: the Commission refused to 
meet with the liberation movement fighting against the 
Salvadoran junta but willingly met with anti-Nicaraguan 
forces. Perhaps because of the attention given his state-
ments, the Commission later amended its plans to include 
a meeting with Salvadoran representatives in Washington 
DC. Unless rather dramatic changes are made, the Kissinger 
Commission promises to serve only as another tool of U.S. 
policy. As Mayor Cisneros stated, "The U.S. generally is 
in a poor position to be either the solution to the problem 
alone, or even to aspire to lead negotiations because of our 
history in the region." D 
THE CONTADORA GROUP 
Working together since their January 1983 meeting on 
Contadora Island (off the coast of Panama), the govern-
ments of Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela have 
attempted to make progress in their effort to reduce ten-
sions in Central America. While their peace initiatives have 
been welcomed by the Central American countries and sup-
ported by many other nations throughout the world, the 
Reagan administration has greeted each success of the CON-
T ADORA Group with skepticism and continued to seek its 
own military solution to the region's problems. 
CONTADORA Group members have warned of the 
danger of viewing Central American conflicts within the con-
text of the East-West confrontation. Their own histories 
have helped them to understand that neither the systemic 
problems of developing countries nor the tensions among 
Latin American countries and the U.S. began with the 1917 
Soviet Revolution or the development of a "Communist 
Bloc." Each of the CONT ADORA nations has had its own 
experience with U.S. intervention. Therefore, the group con-
tinues to stress the importance of non-intervention and self-
determination in its proposals for peace. 
The approach taken by the CONT ADORA Group in its 
search for peace is markedly different from that of U.S.-
sponsored initiatives . The CONTADORA Group has ar-
ranged rounds of discussions between representatives of all 
Central American nations and has incorporated suggestions 
received from each. In response to a Costa Rican govern-
ment request, an Observer Commission consisting of two 
representatives from each country was formed under CON-
T ADORA auspices in May and now continues to serve as 
an advisory group in all matters pertaining to the solution 
of border problems. By September the foreign ministers of 
the CONT ADORA Group and those of Costa Rica, El Sal-
vador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua had reached 
agreement on a document of common objectives that con-
stituted a basis of understanding for future negotiations over 
the mechanisms needed to formalize commitments and en-
sure systems of verification and control. On October 5, 1983 
President Betancur of Colombia was able to announce that 
the five Central American nations had agreed to a declara-
tion on future issues to negotiate, the freeze on arms im-
portation and army size, the reduction of the number of 
military advisors, and the use of one nation's territory for 
the destabilization of another. The declaration, which 
Nicaragua was the first to sign, constitutes a statement of 
intention to begin substantive negotiations on issues outlined 
in the twenty-one point proposal formulated in September 
by the Central American foreign ministers. However, even 
as the declaration was being sent to the U.N. Secretary 
General in accordance with Security Council resolutions on 
the issue, the U.S. was denigrating the value of such 
diplomatic breakthroughs and reiterating its support for 
anti-government forces attacking Nicaragua. The CON-
T ADORA Group has argued that the primary responsibili-
ty for achieving an agreement that will guarantee lasting 
peace and stability falls primarily on the Central American 
nations themselves. Unless the U.S. curtails its military and 
political involvement in the region, however, the efforts of 
the CONTADORA Group will prove futile. D 
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THE U.S. AND NICARAGUA: "AFTER 126 YEARS THE ENEMY IS THE SAME" 
An American visitor to Nicaragua recently saw a banner 
which read, "A 126 anos el enemigo es el mismo" (After 
126 years the enemy is the same). Nicaraguans recall that 
since the 19th century, the U.S. has intervened-both direct-
ly and indirectly-in their internal affairs with great 
regularity. Citing the Monroe Doctrine as the basis for its 
claim, by the mid-1800s, the U.S. sought to expel the British 
from Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast so that it could control the 
area's resources. Pressure from wealthy slaveowners-who 
sought to add Nicaragua as a slave territory-and from 
industrialists-who competed to build railroad and canal 
routes- made the issue of U.S. or British control a central 
theme of Nicaraguan politics until 1894 when the British ef-
fectively transferred control of the region to the U.S. 
Major armed U.S. intervention in Nicaragua began in 
1854 when the Navy destroyed the Nicaraguan town of San 
Juan de! Sur. In 1855 the Tennessee filibuster William 
Walker, accompanied by his 58-man "American Phalanx 
of Immortals," occupied Nicaragua, unilaterally installed 
himself as president, contracted foreign loans which used 
Nicaraguan territory as collateral, reinstituted slavery, con-
fiscated Nicaraguan landholdings for redistribution to U.S. 
citizens, and declared English the official language. 
Although Walker acted as an individual, he was backed by 
the Southern slave states; and he received immediate 
diplomatic recognition from the U.S. government. In 1857 
Walker was defeated by the combined armies of several Cen-
tral American countries and was forced to return to the U.S. 
The administration of President William Howard Taft 
helped to sponsor a revolt and supported the establishment 
of a more pro-American government in 1909 because it 
argued that Nicaragua's president was contributing to in-
ternal turmoil in neighboring states. Three year's later, Taft 
sent more than 12,000 American fighting men to restore 
"stability" to Nicaragua. U.S. financial interests operated 
ti;le railway and the Central Bank, and the U.S. government 
· supervised the collection of custom duties. A small marine 
force remained in the country until 1925. 
In 1927 President Coolidge ordered a second protracted 
military occupation of Nicaragua. The foreign menace to 
be fought was Mexico, which the U.S. described as being 
under "Moscow's influence," charged with promoting 
"bolshevism," and accused of supplying arms to Nicaraguan 
rebels led by General Augusto Cesar Sandino. In 1928 the 
Marines supervised elections at the same time that they 
fought Sandino's forces. On December 31, 1930 eight 
Marines on patrol in the hills were killed by Sandino's guer-
rillas. The resulting uproar from the U.S. led to the 
withdrawal of the Marines from a direct combat role; and 
in two years, the Senate adopted an amendment to the ap-
propriations bill prohibiting the use of funds to transport 
Marines to Nicaragua. 
The solution to its continuing problems in Nicaragua, so 
the U.S. thought, wasrthe creation of a Nicaraguan sub-
stitute for the Marines: the National Guard, a military and 
police force. When the Marines were finally sent home in 
January 1933 unable to win a military victory, they left in 
their stead the National Guard with Anastasio Somoza Gar-
cia as its commander. Sandino, who accepted a ceasefire 
and disarmament agreement in February 1933, was killed 
by the Guard one year later. Somoza consolidated the harsh-
ly repressive rule of the Guard which was continued by his 
son, Anastasio Somoza Debayle. The U.S. plan seemed to 
work for more than four decades-that is, until Somoza 
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Debayle was overthrown by the Sandinista National Libera-
tion Front (FSLN) in 1979. 
In the 1920s Will Rogers is quoted as having asked, "Why 
are we in Nicaragua and what the hell are we doing there?" 
The same questions may be as easily asked today, and the 
answers would be quite simple. The Reagan administration 
is attempting to overthrow the Sandinista government. Cur-
rently, U.S. forces may not be directly "in Nicaragua," but 
the Reagan administration has chosen an exile army, com-
posed of former members of the Guard, who are backed 
by American military power, to serve as its proxy in the war 
with Nicaragua. For more than two years, the CIA has paid, 
supplied, and trained 10,000 counterrevolutionaries, known 
as "contras," who are based in Honduras just across the 
border from Nicaragua. The administration has assured the 
Congress that these "freedom fighters" strike only at 
military targets. The truth is that, since March 1982, the con-
tras have killed more than 700 persons who were mostly 
unarmed civilians. Farm buildings have been destroyed by 
mortar fire; peasants have been kidnapped across the border; 
teachers, health care workers, and agricultural technicians 
have been innocent victims of assassination. 
In early August U.S. army, marine, and air forces units 
began preparing for an unprecedentedly long six months of 
training maneuvers with Honduran forces, including near-
ly 6,000 U.S. combat troops ashore and two carrier task 
groups patrolling positions off Nicaragua's Atlantic and 
Pacific coasts. The administration's assertion that these 
maneuvers are "routine" is completely unfounded. The 
largest previous land exercise in Honduras involved 900 U.S. 
troops and lasted only 6 days. No precedent exists for the 
scale, proximity, or intent of the naval deployments. 
But the U.S.-sponsored wars on Nicaragua's borders can-
not topple the Sandinista government without more direct 
U.S. intervention. The contras may be well-trained and well-
armed, but they are far outnumbered by the Sandinistas. 
More importantly, Nicaraguans-unlike their fellow Cen-
tral Americans-are no longer a people terrorized by their 
own armed forces and will fight to protect hard-won gains 
made since 1979. 
What the Reagan administration wants is a full-scale war 
between Nicaragua and Honduras which Nicaragua would 
appear to have provoked. Such a situation would create the 
perfect pretext for a U.S. invasion. The Sandinistas have 
been exceedingly careful in avoiding such a provocation. Let 
us hope that the Reagan administration has not been so em-
boldened by the recent assault on Grenada as to make this 
pretext unnecessary. D 
PROFILE: NICARAGUA'S ATLANTIC COAST 
Until the Sandinista Liberation Front began the difficult 
task of social reconstruction, the Atlantic region of Nica-
ragua was ignored by the Managua government and in fact 
dominated by external forces seeking to control this strate-
gically located Central American nation. While the land of 
both the Atlantic and Pacific regions was coveted and the 
people of each region exploited, Nicaraguans on the Atlan-
tic Coast were also cruelly neglected. Only the Sandinista 
government has attempted to document and preserve the 
region's unique cultural legacy and to ensure opportunities 
for the participation of its people in Nicaraguan national 
society. Unfortunately however, the complexity of the Atlan-
tic Coast's circumstances and ethnic composition makes it 
a prime target of the U.S. campaign to discredit and destabi-
lize the Nicaraguan revolution . 
By the time the Spanish "discovered" Nicaragua in 1522, 
virtually all the fertile land areas were populated by Indig-
enous people who fiercely resisted attempts to displace them. 
Thousands of Nicaragua's original inhabitants were killed 
or deported to Spain's Viceroyalty of Peru before the con-
quistadores were able to establish settlements along the 
Pacific. The Spanish were unable to effectively penetrate 
the dense jungle and vast savannahs of the Atlantic, how-
ever; and the area became a haven for Africans escaping 
the harshness of Caribbean slavery. Referred to as 
"cimarones," these Africans joined the Indigenous peoples 
of the Atlantic Coast to protect their freedom. 
The Indigenous and African peoples who lived on the 
Atlantic Coast were not to be left in peace. By 1604 English 
slave ships arrived in an attempt to expand the plantation 
economies of the Caribbean, and the English established 
their first settlement on the Atlantic Coast in 1630. Twenty-
five years later, they claimed as a protectorate a strip of Cen-
tral America's Atlantic Coast that stretched from modern 
day Belize to the Nicaraguan-Costa Rican border, and by 
1697 had taken an English-speaking black to Jamaica to be 
crowned "King of the Mosquitia," with the governor of 
Jamaica named as "Mosquitia's" president. This artificially-
created "Indigenous monarchy" survived for almost two 
full centuries as a ruse to cover England's commercial ex-
ploitation of the region's people and natural resources. 
The Miskito people were but one of many Indigenous 
groups which lived along the coast-each speaking their own 
language, retaining their own customs, and reflecting various 
degrees of African influence. English records are illustrative 
of the blatant racism which characterized the period: " ... 
During the last century the whole Caribbean (coast) was 
flooded with escaped slaves . . . The greater the proportion 
of Negro (sic) blood, the more stupid are the tribes ... " 
Thus, whether_ Paya, Suma, Zama, Seco, or Rama peoples, 
racism led each to. be defined along a spectrum of Afro-
Indigepous fusion, with the percentage of African blood the 
distinguishing characteristic. This ethnic composition con-
trasted with the Pacific, where most people were labeled 
mestizos because of their Indian and Spanish origin. 
Along the Atlantic Coast, foreign-owned industries stood 
in sharp contrast to the feudalistic farm system in the 
Pacific. The intimidation used to bind generations of pea-
sants to family haciendas within the Pacific region was un-
necessary in the wage labor enclaves of the Atlantic, where 
English-speaking blacks (Creoles) served as functionaries for 
faceless corporations and controlled mostly illiterate Indig-
enous workers. As a result of this relative lack of repres-
sion, their geographic isolation from the brutalities of the 
Somoza dictatorship, and differences in the cultural legacies 
of British and Spanish colonialism, Atlantic Coast residents 
remained fairly aloof from the revolutionary processes re-
sulting in Somoza's overthrow. 
Today, the historic manipulation of the Atlantic Coast 
continues. U.S. sponsored forces have deliberately chosen 
the Atlantic coast as a war zone. CIA-controlled forces based 
in Honduras consistently cross the border to attack the tradi-
tional homes of Miskito people, forcing the Nicaraguan 
government to evacuate the area and resettle the people in 
order to spare civilian lives. Puerto Cabezas, an important 
port on the Atlantic Coast, has been bombed by those call-
ing themselves representatives of Indigenous people but who 
are organized, financed, and directed by the CIA. 
Despite total U.S. silence on the existence of Indigenous 
and African people in Nicaragua during the Somoza dynas-
ty, the Reagan administration has been quick to accuse the 
Sandinistas of genocidal practices and cultural chauvinism. 
Photos taken of atrocities committed during the Somoza 
regime were instead attributed to the Sandinistas, and anti-
government rebels of Indigenous descent have been pro-
moted as spokespersons of their people. Yet representative 
Indigenous organizations have commended the Sandinistas 
for their attempts to respect and preserve the culture and 
peoples of the Coast. 
The U.S. has similary disregarded other changes taking 
place on the Atlantic Coast. After centuries of deliberate 
neglect, roads have been built, electric and sanitation 
facilities expanded, and television and telephone systems in-
stalled. Health care centers have been established to com-
bat the rampant but preventable diseases of silicosis and 
tuberculosis and to lower an infant mortality rate of one 
hundred twenty per thousand. A massive literacy campaign 
is being conducted in English, Miskito, and Suma in which 
children are taught in their traditional language until fourth 
grade when Spanish is introduced as a second language. 
The U.S. has paid even less attention to changes in racial 
attitudes. Under Somoza's dynasty, the fact that eighty-five 
percent of Nicaragua's people are non-white was down-
played and the existence of Afro-Nicaraguans unpublicized, 
but the Sandinista's proudly assert their Indigenous-African 
heritage and their historic links to the Caribbean. Under 
Somoza, Nicaragua's votes in the UN were aligned 100 per-
cent with those of South Africa, one of Somoza's primary 
supporters; and Nicaraguan law prohibited the immigration 
of "Negroes, ... Arabs, ... and Gypsies." These policies 
have been reversed by the Sandinistas, who have made 
special efforts to express their solidarity with progressive 
African and Caribbean countries, national liberation move-
ments, and Indigenous organizations. Such radical shifts in 
policy have helped to earn the Nicaraguan government the 
respect of African and Indigenous people and the emnity 
of the United States. □ 
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